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16.Coefficient Estimatesof Small Firms 52TESTING FORSTRUCTURAL DIFFERENCESIN GENERAL COMMODITY
MOTOR CARRIAGE
I.INTRODUCTION
The U.S. truckingindustry operatedunder heavy
regulation followingthe Motor CarrierAct of 1935.With
this regulation,the InterstateCommerce Commission(ICC)
controlled the industryrather tightly; theICC could decide
what commoditieswere hauled by whom andthrough which
route.In addition, theICC had authorityover rates and
entry.Under ICC regulation,the carrierswere allowed to
engage in collective ratemaking; thus,antitrust immunity
was provided to carriersto some extent.
Regulatory reformtook place withimplementation of the
Motor Carrier Actof 1980 (MCA)on July 1, 1980.The
purpose of MCA was toreduce restrictionsin order to
promote competitionand to improveservice in theindustry.
Friedlaender andWang-Chiang (1985)showed that the
regulated industryexhibited constantreturns to scale.The
competitive marketenvironment was expectedin the industry.
However, theless-than-truckload (LTL)segment of the
industry has becomemore concentrated followingthe MCA.
This phenomenahas been of interestto many economists
since it seemsthat regulatoryreform has had theopposite
effect from whatwas expected.The increasingconcentration
indicates a lackof competition inthe LTL industry.An
important questionraised by theincreased concentrationis2
whether it is dueto economies ofscale.In other words,
are there cost advantagesrelated to size of thefirm?If
so, this in turn leadsto the possibilityof natural
monopoly or oligopoly.Monopolists by natureoperate at
lower levels ofoutput and higher pricesthan competitive
firms; pricediscrimination isone of the common practices
used by monopolistsas a profit maximizingscheme.Hence,
monopolists willgenerally lower thewelfare ofconsumers
and avert efficientuse of resources ina market.Thus, re-
regulation may beadvocated if monopolytype of cost
structures are indeedthe case.
It is easy toextend the argumentof monopoly to the
trucking industrybecause of the largefixed costs required
by terminals ofLTL trucking firmsthat may createa
sufficient barrieragainst entry intothe market.Evidence
of increasedconcentration in thepost-regulatory LTL
industry is shownby Rakowski (1988)and Kling (1988).
However, the increasein concentrationis not necessarily
due to the monopolisticmarket structure.The possibility
of natural monopolyin the marketwould be indicatedby
scale economies.
As seen in Table1, the results ofsome studies
indicate economiesof scale in theLTL segment of the
industry, whileothers show no suchevidence.Kling (1990),
and Ying (1990) findincreasing returnsto scale, while
McMullen (1990), Winstonet al.(1990), Grimm, Corsi,and3
Jarrell (1989),Harmatuck (1985),and Keeler (1986) find
constant returns toscale.Friedlaender, Spady, andWang-
Chiang (1981)report slight decreasingreturns to scale in
some regions and increasingreturns to scale inothers in
1972, the regulatedperiod.Friedlaender andWang-Chiang
(1985) reportedconstant returns toscale for LTL carriers
in 1976.
Many researcherssuspect that largecarriers have cost
advantages over thesmall.However, constantreturns to
scale are reportedby majority ofeconometric studies.As
for othersources of advantage,some suggest the existence
of economies ofscope in the industry whileothers argue
that large firmshave higher servicequality than smalland
that they are ableto increaserevenues in the less
regulated industry.
The primary objectiveof this study isto compare cost
functions betweenlarge and small LTLcarriers of general
freight commodityin attempt to givereasons for observed
increases inrevenue concentration inthe post-1980 trucking
industry.
The paper is organizedas follows.Section II provides
an overview of theU.S. motor carrierindustry and how it
has changed followingthe MCA.Section III considers
alternative explanationsfor increasedconcentration.The
econometric methodologyand model specificationused are
presented in SectionIV.Empirical resultsare shown in4
Section V, and SectionVI providesa summary of the major
research results.5
Table 1
Economiesof Scale Estimatesin Recent Research
Author Data
Year
Method SegmentReturns to scale
Kling (1990) 1987LoglinearLTL Increasing returns
to scale
Ying (1990) 1984TranslogLTL Increasing returns
to scale 0.88988
(.08014)
McMullen
(1991a)
1988LoglinearLTL Constant returns
to scale
1.0289 (.016) (1991b) 1988TranslogLTL Constant returns
to scale
1.06 (.08657)
Winston et al.1984LoglinearLTL Constant returns (1990) -85 to scale
1.006 (0.0109)
Grimm et al. 1984TranslogLTL Constant returns (1989) -86 to scale
0.9989
Harmatuck 1974TranslogLTL+TLConstant returns (1985) -83 to scale
Friedlaender &1976Hedonic LTL Constant returns Wang-Chiang Translog to scale (1985)
0.998 (.068)
Friedlaender,
Spady, & Wang-
1972Hedonic LTL NE :1.086 (.0376)
Reg: 1.079 (.0273) Chiang (1981)
Inter-regional :
0.897 (.0501)
Keeler (1986) 1966TranslogLTL+TLConstant returns -83 to scale
1.0345 (.0268)
Note: standarderrors are in the parentheses;however, for some studies coefficientsor standard errorscan not be specified due to themethodologies employed.6
II.MOTOR CARRIERINDUSTRY
Segments of TruckingIndustry
The trucking industrycan be divided into twomajor
categories.One is unregulated,which includes the
following types ofcarriers; carriageof exempted
commodities (mainlyagricultural products);private
carriage; and localand intrastateoperations.The other
carriers are regulatedby the ICC, whichafter 1935 had
direct authorityover operations of thesecarriers.These
regulated carriersare further classifiedinto two types of
carriers.The first type ofcarrier is calleda specialized
commodity carrier.It primarilyengages in truckload (TL)
shipments and usuallydeals in specificcommodities suchas
petroleum products,forest products,building materials,
hazardous materials,and etc.In specialized commodity
carriers, thereare wide a variety intechnology between
firms due to thediversities in typesof commoditiesthat in
turn requirescommodity-specifictechnologies.
The other type ofcarrier is acommon carrier of
general freight.Although general freightcarriers
sometimes deal withTL shipments,a large portion of their
traffic consistsof less-than-truckload(LTL) shipments.
LTL shipmentsare arbitrarily definedby ICC as lessthan
10,000 pounds.Although common carriersof general freight
carry a wide variety ofcommodities, smallshipment size7
enables the carriersto employ a relativelyhomogeneous
technology.An important fact isthat this segmentserves
the largest populationof shippers sinceLTL is primarily
for small shippersin cities.This means thatLTL market is
potentially the largestin motor carrierindustry.
Characteristic of theLTL carriers is thefact that
they consolidate theshipments at theirterminals and
redispatch the shipmentsto destinations.Glaskowsky (1990)
clearly explains thatthe reason of suchconsolidation is to
maximize the capacityexploitation of eachtrucks.Whereas
sellers of physicalcommodities cansave unsold goods for
next day as inventory,unused capacity formotor carriers
will be gone withthe dispatched trailer;it can not be
retrieved.
Regulation and Deregulation
Motor carriers becameregulated in 1935 whenrailroads
wanted tosuppress growing motor carriercompetition.The
Motor Carrier Act of1935 gave the ICCauthority over rates,
routes, entry, andmerger and acquisitions inthe trucking
industry except inthe transportationof unprocessed
agricultural products.
In the 1950s thebuilding of the interstatehighway
system enhanced theefficiency of truckingtransportation by
1See Winston et al.(1990)for more detailson the history of regulationin trucking industry.8
shortening travel timeand increasingthe utilization of
larger trucks.Even in the regulatedenvironment, the
trucking industrybecame quite profitable.Due to the
trucking industry'scollective rate makingsystem and entry
restrictions, theLTL sector couldcharge relatively higher
rates than it wouldotherwise.Based largelyon the
evidence of economistswho argued the industryexhibited
constant returns toscale, Congressauthorized Motor Carrier
Act of 1980, whichsignificantly deregulatedthe trucking
industry by allowingmore freedom in rate making,easing
entry restrictionsand encouragingcompetition in the
industry.
After deregulation,there were fluctuationsin the
number of truckingfirms.Because of reducedentry
restrictions, numberof firms in truckingindustry as a
whole increasedfrom 18,000 in 1978to nearly 33,000 in
1985.2However, only a fewof such new entrieswere seen
in LTL sectorof the industry;most of occurrenceswere in
TL sector.This is becausemost entry was smallclass III
firms whichwere mostly TL carriers.Winston et al.
(1990)3 explainsthe change thattook place in LTLmarket.
New entry into theLTL markets camelargely from geographic expansionby existing carriers.Carriers have also beenincreasing the separationof truckload
2Number is quotedfrom Kling (1988):for more detail, see Robert W. Kling.
3For the deregulationin LTL market,see Winston et al. (p 12, 1990)9
and less-than-truckloadactivities.Before deregulation, LTLgeneral freight carriersderived roughly a third oftheir revenuesfrom truckload traffic; by 1987this figure hadfallen to 12 percent.
General freightcarriers obviouslyhave been able to
take advantage ofthe deregulationand generatemore
revenues from LTL activities.The deregulationallowed the
LTL carriers toimprove the efficiencyin their network
reducing emptybackhauls.
The number of firmsthat went out ofbusiness owing to
financial failuresincreased rapidlyunder deregulation.
This bankruptcywas partly due to thehigh cost unionlabor;
under intensecompetition the firmswhich could notreduce
operational costwere ousted.More importantly,rate
discounts becameconspicuous practiceof LTL firms to
attract large shipperssoon after deregulation.Breene
(1983) argues thatin order topractice such"predatory
pricing" scheme,firms need tohave dominant positionin the
market and strongfinancial capability.The regulation
allowed firms tohave larger profitwith collectiveprice
setting, but profitreserves may differ inmarket share of
the firms.
Trend of Concentration
In both Table 2and 3, trend ofrevenue concentration
is shown.In Table 2, thesample includesall of10
Instruction 27 carriers4,and only 100largest carriers in
Instruction 27are considered inTable 3.In Table 2, it is
clear that a largeportion ofrevenue was concentrated in
large carriersbetween 1978 and1987.The trend towards
increased concentrationstarted even earlierthan 1980 in
which the MCAbecame effective.When the share ofrevenue
calculation includesrevenue of all Instruction27 carriers,
the trendseems to be reversedsomewhat for 1988.Figures
for the 1988are very close tothose of 1985.However, when
revenue of only 100largest carriersare used, share of
revenue seems to becontinuously trendedtoward
concentration, andrate of increaseseems to be rather
substantial.Comparing thesetwo approachesas of 1988, it
seems that industryas a whole the trendwas slightly
subsided, and thatonly among 100largest carriersgreat
portion ofrevenue is still consistentlycaptured by a few
firms.Nevertheless, thevery large firmsseem to have been
able to getmore benefit out of thisderegulation than firms
of other sizes.
4Instruction 27 refersto the carriersthat generate more than 75 percentfrom the intercitytransportation of general commodity.The grossrevenues of these carriersare more than $ 4,999,999.11
Table 2 Share of Revenuefor All Instruction27 Carriers, 1978-1988
4-Firm ratio
8-Firm ratio
20-Firm ratio
1978 1979 1980 19811982 1983
0.23 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.3 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.4 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.6 0.65
* 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
4-Firm ratio 0.36
8-Firm ratio 0.48
20-Firm ratio 0.66
0.38 0.38
0.5 0.52
0.68 0.71
0.42 0.37
0.55 0.5
0.71 0.67
Source :Kling (1990),Transportation Journal,p48
Share of Table 3
Revenue for 100Largest Instruction27 Carriers.
Operating Revenue
1979 1984 1985 1988*
Top3 0.2130.2860.309 0.36 Top5 0.2980.3840.393 0.443 Top10 0.41 0.5140.528 0.583
LTL Revenue
1979 1985 1988*
Top3 0.252 0.345 0.399 Top5 0.329 0.435 0.49 Top10 0.43 0.574 0.628
Source :Rakowski (1988)Transportation Journal,p13
*Calculated using datafrom Motor CarrierAnnual Report of 1988.12
III.POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONSFOR INCREASED CONCENTRATION
Kling (1988)argues that the LTL industryhas
significant barriersto entry due tolarge fixed costsuch
as the costly terminalsneeded to consolidateand transfer
shipments.In the regulatedperiod, firms in thisindustry
were not allowed freelyto expand norcompete with prices.
To some extent,the regulationacted as both restrictionand
protection.Limited entry intothe industry andrate
setting bygovernmental authorityprovided protectionto
those firms thatwere already in themarket.However,
without such protection,a firm has to somehowsecure its
position in theindustry.
Although this naturalbarrier to entryexisted even
after deregulation,competitionwas still introducedto the
industry.Competition is usuallyassociated with efficiency
in productionand operation.The efficiency is inturn
reflected in costper output and priceof output.If a firm
can produce its outputat lower cost thanothers, it can
increase its salesshare in market bylowering its price.
The cost per unitof outputmay increase or decrease
according to levelof output produced.This size related
characteristicscan be measured byeconomies of scale.
Economies of scalemanifest the effectsof output levelon
unit cost.If the increase inoutput lowers theunit cost,
economies of scale(increasing returnsto scale)are
present.The increasingreturns to scale willgive firmsan13
incentive toexpand.In contrast, ifan increase in output
raises unit cost,diseconomies of scale(decreasing returns
to scale) exists.The constant returnsto scale indicates
that an increase inoutput has no effecton unit cost.
Nonetheless, theresults from majorityof studies
support the inferenceof constant returnsto scale in the
LTL industry.There may be significantdifferences between
large and smallcarriers in otherproduction technologiesor
operational strategies.
LTL carrierscompete on the basisof service and price.
Keeler (1989)argues that there mustbe "economies of
integration", whichextend to servicequality and marketing
advantages.Large shippersmay prefer to use onlyone large
carrier whichoffers better quality.For example, large
carriers may havebetter service qualitiessuch as speed of
delivery, schedulereliability,more careful handling,or
rate discounts,while small carriersmay have to organize
with or dependon other firms to dothe same.Efficient
work at a terminalmay contribute to speedof delivery.
Larger number of agenciesmay add to the qualityof service.
However, unfortunatelythere are no dataavailable to show
these service qualities.
Marcus (1987)argues that thereare two possible
strategies forshippers to take;one is called "market
dominance" whereshippers spread theirbusiness amongmany
carriers and maintaina pool of carrierslarge enough for14
competition butsmall enough so thatcarriers are dependent
on the shippers fora large portion of theirbusiness.This
type of strategymay be operational foronly large shippers.
The other is called"credible commitments"that shippers
establish a long-termmutually beneficialrelationships with
selected carriersso that they can getbenefits suchas
volume discounts,"continuousmoves, computer tie-ins",and
customized services.With crediblecommitments, large
shippers may geta price discount withlarge number of
commodities sinceless handlingcost involved.The less it
costs, the more possibleto have rate discounts;note that
these are costrelated discounts,not discriminatory
pricing.To many shippers,on-time deliveryprovides the
crucial competitiveedge in theirbusiness, and also
computerized communicationswith carriersmay reduce the
visible amountof transactioncost.Reliability is, thus,
very important factorto select carriersas well as rate.
Such a reliabilitymay be offeredmore exclusively bylarge
firms that havemany terminals throughoutthe nation.
The efficientuse of terminalsseems to make a
significant impacton the operation ofa firm.The number
of terminals anddistance betweenthe terminals makea
difference in minimizationof costs.Larger number of
terminals may alsoenhance the marketingability of the
firm; in manycases, terminals actas agents as well.On15
the contrary, thenumber of interliningactivities5may
have significantrelation to thecost and revenue.Local
carriers may haveto rely on otherfirms to deliver
shipments whichare directed to farbeyond the carriers'
territories; it islikely for the carriersto incur higher
costs in thiscase.If less interliningyields less cost,
improves the speedof delivery,or enhances the efficiency
in use of truck,it is reasonablefor firms tomerge or
acquire other firmswith terminals.
Ann F. Friedlaenderand S. Judy Wang-Chiang(1984)
attempted to includevariables tomeasure network effects in
a cost function oftrucking industryby using the dataset
from 1976,a year in which theregulation was stillfully
effective.They warn that sincea network of terminalsand
routes are essentialfactor of LTLoperation, the omission
of these characteristicsin cost functionestimation may
cause biased results°.They conclude that"economies of
network configurationand of networkoperation" revealthe
basis of a genuineadvantage that largecarriers haveover
the small.Large carrierscan thoroughly exploitthe
"economies of equipmentutilization" and traffic
5Interliningistoconnectwithothermodesof transportationor other motor carriersto deliver commodity from its originto destination.
6
Wang-ChiangandFriedlaender(1985)conducted the likelihood ratiotest to seesignificance ofthe network effects and couldreject the nullhypothesis thatnetwork variables do nothave an impactupon cost.16
circulation.
Friedlaender andWang-Chiang (1985)also estimated
economies ofscope using thesame 1976 data set.In order
to see the economiesof scope, theyhave further dividedLTL
shipments intothree major categoriesaccording to lengthof
haul; short-haul(under 250 miles);intermediate-haul (250-
500); and long-haul(over 500).They argue thatwhile TL
operations do notvary by the length ofhaul, LTL operations
greatly dependon it.The reason providedis that the
primary serviceof short-haul isspeed so that direct
service ismore likely to beoffered, but incase of the
long-haul, shipmentstend to be consolidatedat terminals;
thus, thereare different characteristicsin operations
depending on thelength of haul.
From the results,they argue thatrepresentative
carrier in theirsample exhibitedeconomies ofscope.This
signifies thatproduct mixescan reduce the cost.By
providing short-haul,intermediate-haul, andlong-haul
services ratherthan limiting toone type of service,the
firm can reducethe operatingcosts.Hence, these economies
of scopeencourage the carriersto produce compositeof
different outputtype.They report,however, that economies
of scope forlarge carriersseem to be almostexhausted.
The main implicationis that the gainfrom size is limited
under regulation.
Then what couldbe thereason for the increased17
concentration thatexisted evenbefore the MCA?In fact
most of themergers and acquisitionsthat took place inthe
regulated periodwere to gain operatingrights.The number
of operating rightsissued were confinedby ICC asa tool to
restrict entry.Positive profitsresulted from the
collective ratesetting mighthave made thenew region
attractive to thelarge firms.Thus, even if largefirms
have exhaustedscope economies, marketshare could be the
factor to increasetheir profit underregulation.
With loosenedentry restriction,the question that
arises from theresults of Friedlaenderand Wang-Chiang
(1985) is whetherderegulation changedthe cost structureof
large carriersso that they couldexploit the economiesof
scale or scopefurther, or simplywhether differenttypes of
operational strategyis availableonly to large carriers.
In order tosee why large shareof revenuesare captured by
a few large firms,size of thecarriers shouldbe focused
upon.Using cost functionestimate, thisstudy is conducted
to examine differencesin large andsmall LTL firmsthat
might help explainthe increasingconcentration.18
IV.METHODOLOGY
A translog costfunction will beused in thisstudy.
The translog isa flexible functionalform that placesfewer
restrictions on theestimation thana Cobb-Douglas
functional form.It can be shownthat Cobb-Douglascost
function isa special case ofthe translog costfunction
with additionalrestriction.7Substitution elasticitiesof
Cobb-Douglas costfunction areassumed to be fixed.Thus,
it is difficultto assess theproduction characteristics
using suchrestrictive functionalforms.Furthermore, the
translog functionperforms a localsecond-order
approximation toa unknown cost functions.Thus, no
specific functionalform needs to beassumed to get point
estimates of truecost function.Diewert (1974)assures
that the translogcost functionsufficientlyapproximates an
arbitrary twicedifferentiable costfunction.
In estimation ofcost function,there is a possibility
of aggregationbias.Unless outputsare homogeneous,a
failure to takeinto account ofheterogeneity ofoutputs
will causeaggregation bias inthe estimation.9For
example, output(tonmiles) in theLTL sector of trucking
7For the discussionof the translogcost function,see Diewert (1974).
8The propertiesof translogare cited from Varian (1984).
9For aggregationbias, see Zellner(1962).19
industry aretreated in thesame manner as if all havean
identical impacton the cost, althougheach traffic has its
own characteristicssuch as value ofthe commodity,mileage
of delivery,duration of traffic,etc.Generally this
deficiency is dueto the limitationsin data.In order to
reduce aggregationbias in estimation,some researchersuse
multiple outputs,others use attributevariables that
describe thecharacteristics ofoutputs, and otheruse both
techniques.
Subsequently, theintroduction of multipleoutputs or
attribute variablesrequires moreparameters in thegeneral
form of the translogso that it significantlyreduces the
degrees of freedom.1°In order to solvethis problem,some
researchers use the"hedonic" translogcost function.
Basically, thehedonic is thespecial case ofthe general
translog specification.The hedonic formimposes a set of
restrictions on thegeneral translogcost function inorder
to save a greatdeal of degreesof freedom.However, the
consequences from usingthe hedonic translogcost function
toFrom Oum andTretheway (1989),General translogmodel requires the numberof parameters:
K(k+1) L(L+1) M(M +l)+ KL+ KM + ML 2 2 2
Hedonic translogmodel requiresthe number ofparameters:
M(M+1) K(K+1)
+.1.0/1 + L 2 2
where K is thenumber of inputprices, M outputs,and L attribute variables.20
should be clear.
Oum and Tretheway(1989) explain thatwhile the general
translog can beregarded as quadraticapproximation toa
unknown function,application of thehedonic translog
function involvestwo serioustheoretical limitations.
First, the hedonictranslog functioncan not providea
second-order approximationunless the unknowncost function
has a strongseparability condition.Second, the hedonic
translog cost functionimposes homotheticitycondition on
output aggregators.Since thereare serious setbacksto the
hedonic specification,the generaltranslog cost function
should be encouragedto use wheneverpossible.
The generaltranslog cost functionis used in this
study since thereare a sufficientnumber of observationsin
the data setand also reasonableattribute variablesto
account for heterogeneityof output.
Model Specification
In order to applyduality theory,all firms are
assumed to beminimizing costswith respectto given input
prices, and optimallevel of factorsare determined by given
level of outputs.
The generalcost functioncan be expressedas follows:
C = f (QP, A),
where C is thelong run cost,Q representsoutputs, P isa
vector of inputprices, and A isa vector of output21
attributes.With thesearguments in the model,the general
translog function"can be writtenas:
In C(Q,P,A)= ao + yq(ln Q)+ Ea1(ln Pi)
E OmanAm)
+ 1 yg (ln Q)2
2
+ aid (ln Pi) an Pi)
(lnAm)(lnAn) 2
EBqi(ln (ln Pi)
E EDim(ln Pi) (lnAm)
m
E.Eq(ln Q) (onAm)
+ e,
where ln is naturallog, and e isan independent,
identically distributedrandom error.Symmetry conditions,
airaii and 8m=Bm,are imposed.Homogeneity of degreeone in
input pricesrequires the followingparameter restrictions:
E ai =1
E aii =E
E Eqi= 0
EDim = 0.
=0
All variablesare normalized by thegeometricmean.
With Shephard's Lemma12,the conditionaldemand
See Christensenand Greene (1976)and Greene (1990)for the general translogcost function andparameter restrictions.
12Thederivationofshareequationsisshownby Christensen andGreene (1976) andBerndt and Wood(1975).22
function for i°factor of productionsare easily computed by
taking the partialderivative of costfunction withrespect
to i° factor price;that is,
aC(Q, P, A)
aPi
Differentiating thelogarithm of costwith respect to 1th
input price givesthe share of the 1°input,
ac
ainc C ac Pi_XiPi
a1nPiap18P1 c C
Pi
where Si is thefactor share of 1°input.Accordingly,
differentiation of thetranslog cost functiongives the
factor share equationsof the form,
Si = oci +E ocii (1nPi) +EDi, (1nA,)+Eqi(Inc)) 4-Ei
where ci is disturbanceterm.Scale economiescan be
measured by takingderivative of costfunction with respect
to output.
a 1nC
a 1nO-yq-1-7qq(1n0)+EBqi(lnPi)+Egq,(1nAm)
This is ameasure of the elasticityof cost with respectto
output; percentagechange in totalcost when there isa one
percent change inoutput.If the elasticityis larger than
one, it indicatesdecreasing returnsto scale; ifone,
constant returns toscale; if smallerthan one, increasing
returns to scale.The returns toscale at themean of the23
sample can beseen as yq alonewhen typical firm isassumed
to have meanvalue of allvariables; since allvariablesare
normalized at themean, all terms exceptyq will be equal to
zero.
The disturbancesin the systemof equationsare assumed
to be multivariate-normally
distributed withmean zero.The
translog cost functionis simultaneouslyestimated with
factor share equationsin order toimprove efficiencyin
coefficients andalso to calculatethe elasticitiesof
substitutions.Full informationmaximum likelihood
estimator (FIML) isused for estimation;FIML is virtually
the sameas iterative Zellner'sseemingly unrelated
estimator.The maximumlikelihood estimatorprovides the
asymptotic properties.
In this model,four factor sharescan be formed since
four inputsare assumed to beused in theproduction.Since
factor shares willsum up to one,multi-collinearityproblem
occurs; disturbancecovariance matrixof share equations
will be singular.Hence, one of theshare equations is
dropped; the choiceof equation tobe deleted fromthe
system does notmatter in maximumlikelihood estimation13
while the estimatesresulted fromFeasible Generalized
Least Square (FGLS)estimator dependson which share
equation is dropped.Thus, the utilizationof FIML
uTheresultfrom droppingoneshareequationis discussed in LautisR.Christensen andWilliam H.Greene (1976)24
estimator is essentialin this particularnature of
estimation.In this model, thefactor share equationfor
purchased transportationis dropped fromthe system of
equations.The coefficientsin the deletedequation can be
recovered using theresulted estimatesfrom other equations
so that elasticitiesof substitutionscan be calculated.
One of the benefitsof using translogcost function is
its flexibility.The functionallows substitutionamong
factors of productionto vary as wellas scale economies
with the levelof outputsso that it is reasonableto
estimate theelasticities ofsubstitution andscale
economies.Another attractivefeature of the translogcost
function is that itis especiallyeasy to calculate the
elasticities ofsubstitutiononce the coefficientsare
estimated.Allen and Uzawahave independentlyderived the
partial elasticitiescalled Allen-Uzawapartial elasticities
of substitution(AUE) between inputi and j whichare
generally expressedin the form,
C*[82cI
apiap;
ac ac
api
where by definition."For the translogcost
function, AUEcan be calculatedas follows:
14The definitionof AUE and thederivation of these elasticity estimatesare presented by Berndtand Wood (1975), and the actualcalculation isdemonstrated byGreene (1990).Qi3 _
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where Si is thefitted value ofthe cost shareof ith input.
Own price elasticitiesof demand is definedas
Aw and Roberts(1985) explainthat AUEmeasures the use
of input icorresponding toa change in the priceof j
holding otherprices and outputfixed but allowing
quantities of theother inputs tooptimally adjustto the
new levels.Positive (negative)sign symbolizes
substitutional(complimentary) relationbetween two
inputs.15In this study,elasticitiesare evaluated at
mean.The estimatesof elasticitiesof substitutiongive a
good insight intothe operationalcharacteristics ofLTL
carriers.
Homogeneity ofCarriers
In some studies(Grimm, Corsi,and Jarrell(1989)),
researchers regardfirms in Instruction27 as LTL firmsand
15For representationof the AUE,see Aw and Roberts (p114, 1985).26
Instruction 28Aas TL firms.16However, some firms in
Instruction 28Aoperate as generalfreight carrierswith LTL
activities, andsome Instruction 27carriers engage inTL
activities.Further, Instruction27 carriers tendto be
larger thanInstruction 28Acarriers.Thus, raising the
question of whichis themore important distinction:
dividing the carriersby Instructiondefinitionor by size.
If two sectorsare distinctive onlyby size, theefficiency
gain in thecost estimationcan be achieved bycombining two
instructions.Also, itmay make a differencein therevenue
concentration ratio.In an attempt totest for structural
differences betweengeneral freightcommodity firms,three
possible groupingsare considered.
First, firms intwo sectionsare simply regarded
different fromeach other bythe instructiondefinition.
Instruction 27carriers arethose who obtainan average of
more than 75 percentof theirrevenues from theintercity
transportation ofgeneral commodities.Instruction 28
includes carriersof generalcommodities thatdo not satisfy
the conditionsof Instruction27 and carriersof special
commodities excepthousehold goods.Both sectionsrefer to
Class I and II carriers17.
16Motor CarrierAnnual Report(1988)classifies the Instruction28A asClassIandIIcarriersofgeneral commodities notcovered by Instruction27.
17 ClassI carriersare those with totalannual operating revenue of more than$5 million.Class II carriersare those with totalannual operatingrevenue of between $1million and27
Second, the twogroups are pooledand separated atthe
median of output,defined by tonmiles.Then, onegroup will
consist of firmsthat lie abovemedian (upper 50°
percentile), andthe other willinvolve firms thatare below
the median (lower50th percentile).Thus, the pooleddata
are divided intogroups of large andsmall firms basedon
their tonmiles.Third, the pooleddata are separatedat the
median ofrevenue.This providesan alternativedefinition
for large andsmall firms basedon revenue.
Separate regressionsare run for eachsubgroup as well
as a pooled regression.18To see if thesamples are indeed
different, asymptotictesting is conducted.Let wed and
L(ea) be the logof likelihoodfunction from therestricted
estimator and ofunrestricted estimatorrespectively; in
case of this study,L(80 is sum oflog of likelihood
function from twoseparate estimations.If the null
hypothesis istrue, the likelihoodratio statisticsin
asymptotic testing19is writtenas
and is asymptoticallydistributed asChi-square (x2) with
$4,999,999.
18
Separate regressionsin eachcase are performedrather than one pooledregression withdummy variablesbecause this method yieldsmore unrestrictedresults.The regression with dummy variablesassumes identicalvariance-covariancematrices intwosamples. Incontrast,thedifferent variance- covariance matricesare allowed incase of the separate regression.See Denny andFuss (1983) formore detail.
19The source ofasymptotic testingis Judge etal. (1988).28
LR= -2 logX = -2 [L(00-L(0)]
degrees of freedomequal to the numberof hypothesis;number
of coefficientsin this study.The null hypothesisis
rejected if LR islarger than thevalue of Chi-squareat
some significance leve1.20
Data and Variables
Data for theestimation is fromthe Motor Carrier
Annual Report(1988).The sample includesall Class I and
II general freightcommodity carriersreported in
Instruction 27 and28A.The original numberof firms for
Instruction 27 and28A are 267 and316 respectively,but
some observationsare excluded due toobviouserrors or
simply incompletedata.For example, onlypositive factor
shares are usedfor estimationto ensure themonotonicity.
Thus, final samplesconsist of 207 firmsfor Instruction27
and of 89 firmsfor Instruction 28A.21
As total costof each firm,a 12 percent ofopportunity
20Caution shouldbe taken concerninghypothesis testing, however, sincethere may beheteroscedasticity usingcross- sectional observations.Srivastava and Giles(1987) states that nature ofthe iteratedseemingly unrelatedregression estimator withheteroscedasticity isnot yet wellknown.
21 Thecarriers in Instruction28A are not requiredto report as much dataas the Instruction27 carriers,so that a large number ofobservationsare excluded due tolack of information.29
cost for netcarrier operatingproperty and equipment22and
working capital23is added tooperating cost.
One output, fourprices, and fourattributes are
used,as exogenousvariables in thetranslog cost function.
Tonmiles are usedas output (Q).
In order tocapture the heterogeneityof output, four
attribute variablessuch as averagelength of haul(AH),
average load (AL),average shipment size(AS), and insurance
(INS), are used.ALH is definedas tonmiles dividedby
total tons.ALH is expectedto be negative,reflecting the
cost taper thatoccurs with distance.AL is calculatedas
tonmiles dividedby total vehiclemiles; averagevehicle
loads is includedto capture theeffect of routedensity.
Fewer empty backhaulsand light-backhaulsimprove efficiency
in use offactor inputsso that it shouldbe associated with
lower costs.INS is computedas total insuranceper
tonmile; thismeasures the averagevalue or characteristics
of commoditiesshipped.More expensiveor fragile
commodities needspecial handlingso that it willcontribute
to higher cost;therefore, positiverelation withcost is
expected.AS is calculatedas total tons dividedby total
number of shipments.This is includedto capture theimpact
22Net operatingproperty is convertedto real value by applying the tenyear average ofproducer's priceindexes for motor trucks.
23
Working capitalis derivedas current assetsminus liabilities.30
of transactionsand handlingcosts.Larger average shipment
size requiresless transactionsand handling thusreducing
costs.Thus, sign of thecoefficient is expectedto be the
negative.Unfortunately, datawere not available for
network variablessuch as those usedby Friedlaenderand
Wang-Chiang.Thus, there isno direct measure ofnetwork
effects.
Factor pricesare the price of fuel(PF), the price of
labor (PL), the priceof purchasedtransportation (PR),and
the price of capital(PK) are used.The price of labor(PL)
is calculatedas total wages plustotal fringe benefits
divided by the totalnumber of employees.The price of
purchased transportation(PR) is computedas purchased
transportationexpense per the milesrented.The price of
capital (PK)is computedas residual expenses(total cost
minus fuel, labor,and purchasedtransportation
expenditures) dividedby net operatingproperty plus working
capital.The price of fuel(PF) is fuel andoil expenditure
divided by totalgallons.Total gallonsare computed as
total vehicle milesdivided by fivewhere five isassumed to
be mileageper gallon.For those firmsthat did not report
the fuelexpense and purchasedtransportation figuresor
that have unreasonablevalues, regionalaverages are used.31
V.EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Estimation ofInstruction 27 and28A
Table 4 shows thelog of likelihoodfunction of each
separate estimationas well as pooledestimation.For each
case of separations,the null hypothesisthat two
estimationsare not significantlydifferent is rejectedat
the significancelevel of 0.005.The likelihoodratio for
each case ispresented as LR inTable 4.The results
indicate thatthere areheterogeneous segmentsin general
freight commoditycarriage.The log of likelihoodfunction
is the largestwhen sample isdivided by thedefinition of
the "instruction."This impliesthat the "instruction
definition" showsmore evident distinctionof the cost
structures betweenInstruction 27(1-27) and 28A(I-28A)
carriers thanwhen divided bytonmiles orrevenue.
There aremany possible differencesin these twogroups
such as technologiesemployed and primaryservices provided
although both twogroups are said to beClass I and II
common carriers ofgeneral commodities.Table 8 shows that
I-28A carriers havelarger mean valuefor AL, ALH, andAS.
These valuesmay be thereason why Grimm, Corsi,and Jarrell
(GCJ,1989) treatedthe I-28A carriersas general freightTL
carriers and1-27 carriersas general freightLTL carriers.
TL carriersusually havea service of heavierload, larger
shipment size,and long-haul.Then, it may bereasonable to32
treat Instructioncarriers as generalfreight TL carriers.
In Table 9 and10, it can beseen that firms in 1-27
have larger costshare in labor andsmaller cost share in
purchased transportation(shown as Rented)than I-28A firms.
It implies thatcarriers in 1-27are more labor-intensive
and those inI-28A are moredependent on purchased
transportation.For bothgroups, it is interestingto see
that fuel is thesmallest part ofthe operationalcosts.
As for elasticities,the most pricesensitive factor is
purchased transportationfor 1-27 (-0.64717),but capital
for I-28A(-0.69295).1-27 firmsseem to be relativelymore
price sensitiveto purchasedtransportation thanI-28A
firms.This also symbolizesan important role ofpurchased
transportation inI-28A carriers justas indicated by large
factor share.
The sign ofelasticity of substitutionbetween
purchased transportationand fuel can beeither positive
(substitutes) ornegative (complements)since purchased
transportation includesboth rented servicesand rented
capital.Fuel can bea complement to rentedcapital
(trucks) anda substitute forrented services.The rented
service can besubstitute since itis often employedwhen
excess or "peak" loadsexist.Accordingly, thiselasticity
of substitutionbetween purchasedtransportation andfuel
(-0.35060) in I-28Aindicates more ofthe complementaryrole
of fuel topurchased transportation.The elasticity of33
substitution (1.29083)in 1-27 exhibitshigh degree ofthe
substitution betweenthese two factors.From the result,
larger portion ofpurchased transportationin I-28Amay be
rented trucks; whenfuel pricegoes up, less trucksare
rented.
The argumentsabove may seem tobe contradictoryto the
positive sign ofthe elasticitiesof substitutionbetween
fuel and capital.Fuel is undoubtedlycomplement to trucks,
but in this study,capital includesnot only trucks butalso
other equipmentsused in administrationand terminals.
Thus, lowsubstitutabilitiesbetween fuel andcapital is the
net effect ofdifferent types of capital.24Small
substitutabilitybetween labor andfuel may indicatesthe
tactics of LTLfirms.When fuel pricegoes up, as a cost
minimizing approach,LTL firm may takea combination ofmore
consolidation activitiesat terminals andless line-haul.
Relatively largesubstitutability betweenlabor and capital
explains thecharacteristics (terminalconsolidations and
line-haul) of LTLoperations.
In Table 11 and12, estimatedcoefficientsare
reported.Null hypothesisof constant returnsto scale can
not be rejectedfor either section.This result is
24
Friedlaender andBruce distinguishedtwo types of capital in theirestimation; one iscalled revenueequipments that consists oftrucks,and the other iscalled general capital that includesall other capitals.They show that revenue equipments andfuel are complementarybut general capital and fuelare substitutable. For more detailsee Friedlaender andBruce (p58, 1985)34
consistent withthat of GCJ andMcMullen (1991a and1991b).
GCJ foundno scale economiesfor both groups ofcarriers in
either 1977or 1984-1986.
All of theattribute coefficientshave the expected
signs exceptinsignificant ALH inI-28A.Estimates for 1-27
show significanteconomies of routedensity, of lengthof
haul, and ofshipment size.This isseen by the estimated
coefficients forAL, ALH, and AS.In contrast,there is no
evidence ofeconomies ofany kind in I-28A.These results
may be interpretedin twoways.One is that thecarriers in
I-28A alreadyexhausted the economiesof route density,of
length of haul,and of shipmentsize.The other isthat
assuming the carriersin two sectionsare engaging in
distinctive services,the resultsindicate characteristics
of two differentoperations.35
Table 4
Likelihood Ratio ofDifferent Groupings
Likelihood ofPooled: 1044.25
Large Small Total LR
Tonmile 616.789 536.409 1153.198 217.896
Revenue 628.895 498.837 1127.732 166.964
1-27 I-28A Total LR Instruction
Definition 881.491 287.492 1168.983 249.46636
Table 5
Sample Means of Variablesin Pooled (Instruction27 and 28A)
Pooled sample
MEAN STD DEV
Q 262355.1 938853.1
AL 10.550885.68318
ALH 388.9655 384.1427
INS 0.01548 0.0242
AS 7.78053 13.66479
NUMBER OF OBSERVATION :296
Table 6
Sample Means ofInstruction 27 and28A
Instruction 27
MEAN STD DEV Instruction 28A
MEAN STD DEV
Q 313205.71109060 144084.5235078.4 AL 9.413284.78937 13.196746.66732 ALH 347.4432330.8853 485.5398474.2334 INS 0.015880.01679 0.014560.03608 AS 3.965226.52462 16.6543220.30832
NUMBER OF OBSERVATION
:207 8937
Table 7
Elasticity Estimatesand Cost Share ofInstruction 27
Labor
Partial
Capital
Elasticities ofSubstitution
Labor Rented Fuel
0.83000
Rented 1.18064 0.45157
Fuel 0.52181 0.02741 1.29083
Own Price
Elasticities-0.60567-0.37088-0.64717-0.44455
Cost Share 0.30647 0.50866 0.14098 0.04389
Table 8
Elasticity Estimatesand Cost Share ofInstruction 28A
Labor
Partial
Capital
Elasticities ofSubstitution
Labor Rented Fuel
0.84689
Rented 1.38249 0.16408
Fuel 0.52705 0.58377-0.35060
Own Price
Elasticities-0.69295-0.37884-0.24961-0.50711
Cost Share 0.31124 0.31273 0.31173 0.0642938
Table 9
Coefficient estimatesof Instruction 27
PARAMETER ESTIMATE
STANDARD
ERROR T-STATISTIC
CONST 11.218 0.16019 70.031
Q 1.0092 0.073971 13.643 **
Q *Q 0.0070093 0.028825 0.24317
Q*PK -0.00558420.0080613 -0.69271
Q*PR 0.00350660.0098971 0.3543
Q*PF -0.00393510.0020869 -1.8856*
Q*PL 0.00601270.0089876 0.669
Q*AL 0.0047036 0.05841 0.080527
Q*ALH -0.013454 0.042264 -0.31832
Q*INS 0.010496 0.044632 0.23517
Q*AS -0.037082 0.02254 -1.6451*
PK 0.33677 0.027669 12.171
PK*PK 0.0193840.0098735 1.9632
**
PK*PR 0.012132 0.012431 0.97588
PK*PF -0.00769870.0030246 -2.5453"
PK*PL -0.023817 0.01014 -2.3487"
PK*AL 0.0039028 0.026648 0.14646
PK*ALH 0.02491 0.016269 1.5311
PK*INS 0.031277 0.0221 1.4152
PK*AS 0.020916 0.009236 2.2646
PR 0.19942 0.038613 5.1646
PR*PR 0.030593 0.029092 1.0516
PR*PF 0.00277260.0030019 0.92361
PR*PL -0.045497 0.016625 -2.7366"*
PR*AL -0.059987 0.044963 -1.3341
PR*ALH 0.036265 0.029519 1.2285
PR*INS -0.03034 0.029987 -1.0118
PR*AS 0.050008 0.013086 3.8215"*
PF 0.0478060.0061942 7.717939
Table 9Continued
PARAMETER ESTIMATE
STANDARD
ERROR T-STATISTIC
PF*PF 0.0242690.0041147 5.898"*
PF*PL -0.0193430.0041102 -4.706"*
PF*AL -0.0171310.0077375 -2.214
PF*ALH 0.0163640.0046599 3.5115
PF*INS -0.0043090.0052168 -0.82598
PF*AS 0.0116520.0023346 4.9912"*
PL 0.41601 0.038494 10.807*"
PL*PL 0.088657 0.012816 6.9175
* **
PL*AL 0.073215 0.035885 2.0402
**
PL*ALH -0.077538 0.025865 -2.9978"*
PL*INS 0.0033715 0.028358 0.11889
PL*AS -0.0825760.012932 -6.3852"
AL -0.80762 0.18153 -4.4489"*
AL*AL -0.061543 0.20276 -0.30354
AL*ALH -0.3422 0.1015 -3.3714***
AL*INS -0.12141 0.11318 -1.0728
AL*AS -0.26267 0.059728 -4.3978***
ALH -0.54936 0.12885 -4.2637"*
ALH*ALH -0.040758 0.10624 -0.38364
ALH*INS -0.2475 0.10341 -2.3935"
ALH*AS 0.066917 0.04476 1.495
INS 0.069461 0.17695 0.39255
INS*INS -0.084932 0.12796 -0.66374
INS*AS -0.068777 0.059913 -1.1479
AS -0.25331 0.084214 -3.008"*
AS*AS 0.12963 0.047285 2.7414
LOG-LIKELIHOOD RATIO=881.491
NUMBER OF OBSERVATION= 207
*significantlydifferentfromzeroatthe0.1 level **significantlydifferentfromzeroatthe0.05level ***significantlydifferentfromzeroatthe0.001level40
Table 10
Coefficient EstimatesofInstruction 28A
PARAMETER ESTIMATE
STANDARD
ERROR T-STATISTIC
CONST 10.381 0.53066 19.563"*
Q 0.85435 0.362 2.3601"
Q *Q -0.031805 0.26362 -0.12065
Q*PK 0.015414 0.028663 0.53776
Q*PR 0.0068409 0.050085 0.13659
Q*PF -0.0045313 0.0085941 -0.52727
Q*PL -0.017723 0.039891 -0.4443
Q*AL -0.21879 0.31875 -0.6864
Q*ALH -0.055444 0.28154 -0.19693
Q*INS -0.12579 0.20774 -0.6055
Q*AS 0.094344 0.14176 0.6655
PK 0.34748 0.068727 5.056"*
PK*PK -0.01405 0.021861 -0.64267
PK*PR 0.039665 0.037835 1.0484
PK*PF -0.010021 0.010177 -0.98467
PK*PL -0.015594 0.024538 -0.63551
PK*AL 0.034962 0.067275 0.51969
PK*ALH -0.0046545 0.030504 -0.15259
PK*INS 0.04654 0.04328 1.0753
PK*AS -0.0060919 0.032887 -0.18524
PR 0.29844 0.14208 2.1005"
PR*PR 0.058033 0.11053 0.52503
PR*PF -0.024579 0.023619 -1.0406
PR*PL -0.07312 0.063691 -1.148
PR*AL -0.014906 0.11184 -0.13328
PR*ALH 0.01216 0.051473 0.23623
PR*INS -0.086001 0.088782 -0.96867
PR*AS 0.011221 0.055042 0.20385
PF 0.060978 0.028754 2.1207"41
Table 10 Continued
STANDARD
PARAMETER ESTIMATE ERROR T-STATISTIC
PF*PF 0.042039 0.012741 3.2995"*
PF*PL -0.0074392 0.013518 -0.55032
PF*AL -0.012359 0.022619 -0.5464
PF*ALH 0.0079512 0.013761 0.57779
PF*INS 0.0033765 0.017847 0.1892
PF*AS 0.010574 0.012807 0.82563
PL 0.2931 0.082182 3.5665"*
PL*PL 0.096153 0.046937 2.0485"
PL*AL -0.0076972 0.058955 -0.13056
PL*ALH -0.015456 0.046387 -0.3332
PL*INS 0.036084 0.056143 0.64273
PL*AS -0.015702 0.025084 -0.62597
AL -0.096169 0.78162 -0.12304
AL*AL 0.99226 0.78558 1.2631
AL*ALH 0.067708 0.57396 0.11797
AL*INS 0.5109 0.41681 1.2257
AL*AS 0.11051 0.30189 0.36606
ALH 0.069565 0.52771 0.13183
ALH*ALH 0.10946 0.43639 0.25082
ALH*INS 0.06532 0.39645 0.16476
ALH*AS -0.055371 0.29166 -0.18985
INS 0.68111 0.61811 1.1019
INS*INS 0.30099 0.37191 0.8093
INS*AS 0.16779 0.20534 0.8171
AS 0.067035 0.4312 0.15546
AS*AS -0.014827 0.21923 -0.067634
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION =287.492
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =89
significantly differentfrom zeroat the 0.1 level **significantly differentfrom zeroat the 0.05 level *** significantlydifferentfrom zeroat the 0.001 level42
Estimation for Largeand Small Section 27Carriers
In order tocompare the characteristicsof large and
small firms, thesample from Instruction27 is further
separated into twogroups.Only the sample ofInstruction
27 carriers is usedsince in these carriersthe revenue
concentration is takingplace.Table 12 shows the
concentration ratiosbased on tonmile.It is apparent that
ratios calculatedwith whole carriersand those with 100
largest carriers showsignificant differencesfrom revenue
concentration ratios.The tonmile concentrationratios
reveal even greatermagnitude of concentrationin the LTL
industry.The trend of concentrationcan not be shown since
only data for 1988is available in thisstudy.Nonetheless,
the trend of concentrationmay be substantiallydifferent if
tonmile is used.Accordingly, level ofoutput (tonmile) is
used to define thelargeness of carriers.Thus, sample is
divided at the medianof tonmiles.In order to testwhether
or not large and smallfirms reveal thestructural
differences, asymptotictests are conducted.The null
hypothesis that twoestimations are notsignificantly
different is rejectedat significancelevel of 0.005.The
generalized Reis calculatedto measure thegoodness of fit
for the model25.The value of generalized R2is 0.99 for
25The generalized R2is calculatedas
1 -exp [2 (L1L2) /T]43
both cases indicatinga very well fit of data tothe model.
In Table 13 and14, the elasticity estimatesand factor
shares for typicalfirms in twogroups are presented.It is
interesting to notethat both groupshave very close factor
shares in their operatingcosts except labor andpurchased
transportation.Large firms seem tohave slightly larger
share of purchasedtransportation whilesmall firms seem to
have larger share inlabor.This implies thatlarge firms
utilize relativelymore purchased transportation,and small
firms are slightlymore labor-intensive.
As for elasticities,the price sensitivefactors for
large firms are capitaland fuel, and forsmall firms is
purchased transportation.All factors exceptfuel-labor in
small firms aresubstitutes to eachother.When price of
fuel increases,large firms can reducethe line-haul and
increase the consolidationat terminal.On the other hand,
small firmsmay not have thesame option sincemany small
firms do not haveterminals.
Table 11 presentsthe values ofmean for each group.
Comparing themean of variables in twosamples, large firms
have twice as longlength of haul andtwice the shipment
size as smallerfirms.The mean ofaverage load is very
where L1 is the maximumvalue of log oflikelihood function when the coefficientsof all right-handside variablesare constrained to bezero,L2 is the maximumvalue of log of likelihood functionwhen all coefficientsare included in the model, and T is thenumber of observations.For more details on generalized R2,see Berndt and Khaled(1979).44
close between twosamples, but thatof insurance in small
firms is fargreater than that oflarge firms.This
suggests that smallfirms carry highervalued commodities.
According to Friedlaenderand Wang-Chiang(1985), the
types of serviceare classified by thelength of haul.They
argue that primary serviceof short-haul (250miles) is
speed of deliveryand thus, direct deliveryis more likely
to be provided whileintermediate haul(250-500 miles)
enables firms toconnect the short-hauland long-haul (over
500 miles) trafficmore effectively.This is exactly the
difference shownbetween means ofALH in twogroups.For
large firms,mean of ALH is 484.19;for small firms,
212.012.This is moreapparent looking atFigure 1.Figure
1 shows thata great number of smallfirms are engagingin
the short-haul service,and that servicesof large firmsare
more balanced in lengthof haul.Following the
classifications ofoutputs specified byFriedlaender and
Wang-Chiang, the typicallarge firm seemsto engage in the
intermediate haul andtypical small firm,short-haul.
Unfortunately data usedhere do not allowestimation of
scope economies.However, if scope economiesare present
for large carriers,then there isan incentive to transport
in more mixedcommodities to reduceoperating costs.If
such a commodity mixcan be obtained by acquiringsmall
firms, large firmsjust may doso.
Both samples failedto reject the hypothesisof45
constant returns toscale.All coefficients haveexpected
sign.However, thereare interesting differencesbetween
these two groups.The coefficient ofinsurance in small
firms is significantwhile that of largefirms is not
significantly differentfrom zero.On the other hand,
average load in sample oflarge firms is stillsignificant
while that of smallfirms is not.It implies that large
firms can potentiallyreduce costs by increasingroute
density, while smallfirms do not.The route densitycan be
increased by minimizingempty back-hauls.Grimm et al.
(1989) argue thatthese economies ofroute density may be
effectively improvedby utilization ofmodern equipmentsas
follows:
This may well reflectthe well-documentedgrowth of Advanced Truckload firms,who use sophisticated
computer vehicle routingalgorithms to matchconsumer demand with equipmentavailability in highdensity traffic corridors withbalanced freight flows.26
This high-techoperation may benefitlarge firms more
because the operationof large firmscovers large
geographicalarea and have vast network.These
sophisticated toolsmay help save timeas well as associated
cost organizingvery complicated routingsfor large firms.
It is apparent thatfirms in two samplesare operating
differently or providingdifferent services.That is, small
firms are specializingin more valuablecommodities with
mainly short distancedelivery service whileservice of
26Quoted from Grimmet al.(p244, 1989)46
large firms ismore diverse.Large firms providesmore
intermediate-hauland long-haul servicescarrying varietyof
commodities.47
Table 11
Sample Means ofLarge and Small Firms
Large
MEAN
Firms
STD DEV
Small
MEAN
Firms
STD DEV
Q 612352.11517927 16935.7513450.45 AL 11.612724.19037 7.2354.34268 ALH 484.1893345.1982 212.012252.4799 INS 0.008550.00634 0.023140.02042 AS 5.227687.84319 2.71491 4.5881
NUMBER OFOBSERVATION :103 104
Table 12
Concentration RatioBased on Revenue andTonmile
All Instruction27 Carriers
4-Firm ratio
8-Firm ratio
20-Firm ratio
RevenueTonmile
1988 1988
0.37 0.41
0.5 0.55
0.67 0.71
100LargestInstruction 27 Carriers
RevenueTonmile
* 1988 1988
Top3 0.36 0.37 Top5 0.433 0.48 Top10 0.583 0.62
* Calculatedconcentration ratiosby tonmiles.48
Table 13
Elasticity Estimatesand Cost Share ofLarge Firms
Labor
Partial
Capital
Elasticities of Substitution
Labor Rented Fuel
0.97919
Rented 1.31843 0.19031
Fuel 0.58814 0.56242 1.36044
Own Price
Elasticities-0.73098-0.38069-0.56282-0.72448
Cost Share 0.29938 0.47545 0.18180 0.04337
Table 14
Elasticity Estimatesand Cost Share ofSmall Firms
Labor
Partial
Capital
Elasticities of Substitution
Labor Rented Fuel
0.80345
Rented 0.97695 0.99515
Fuel 0.51759-0.19986 1.35665
Own Price
Elasticities-0.51378-0.40051-0.89141-0.25468
Cost Share 0.31349 0.541550.10055 0.0444149
Figure 1 Many small firmsare specializing in short-haul
service while large firmsare more diverse.50
Table 15
Coefficient EstimatesofLarge Firms
STANDARD
PARAMETER ESTIMATE ERROR T-STATISTIC
CONST 11.509 0.21059 54.651"*
Q 0.97927 0.14802 6.6158*"
Q*Q -0.0311 0.083063 -0.37441
Q*PK -0.016271 0.018266 -0.89078
Q*PR -0.0070593 0.034627 -0.20387
Q*PF -0.0030196 0.0065362 -0.46198
Q*PL 0.02635 0.02259 1.1664
Q*AL 0.019887 0.25331 0.07851
Q*ALH 0.014621 0.1462 0.1
Q*INS -0.0073036 0.1089 -0.06707
Q*AS -0.046114 0.063858 -0.72213
PK 0.31174 0.032503 9.5911"*
PK*PK -0.013317 0.027487 -0.48447
PK*PR 0.023049 0.022475 1.0255
PK*PF -0.0071335 0.0057044 -1.2505
PK*PL -0.0025982 0.027815 -0.093413
PK*AL 0.042509 0.055725 0.76284
PK*ALH 0.017297 0.036781 0.47028
PK*INS 0.028095 0.028383 0.98986
PK*AS 0.018122 0.015249 1.1884
PR 0.23218 0.063622 3.6494"*
PR*PR 0.047596 0.068037 0.69957
PR*PF 0.0046496 0.0086658 0.53655
PR*PL -0.075295 0.04638 -1.6234
PR*AL -0.061284 0.11072 -0.55349
PR*ALH 0.029818 0.058358 0.51096
PR*INS -0.035975 0.059485 -0.60477
PR*AS 0.053815 0.022066 2.4388"
PF 0.05556 0.010131 5.4843"*51
Table 15 Continued
STANDARD
PARAMETER ESTIMATE ERROR T-STATISTIC
PF*PF 0.0122210.0084163 1.4521
PF*PL -0.0097373 0.010239 -0.95098
PF*AL -0.0051028 0.022454 -0.22725
PF*ALH 0.012269 0.011716 1.0473
PF*INS -0.0027281 0.01003 -0.27199
PF*AS 0.012605 0.003887 3.2428***
PL 0.40052 0.051368 7.7969
* **
PL*PL 0.08763 0.050311 1.7418*
PL*AL 0.023877 0.059892 0.39868
PL*ALH -0.059385 0.039769 -1.4933
PL*INS 0.010608 0.049173 0.21573
PL*AS -0.084541 0.016147 -5.2356"*
AL -1.1027 0.57158 -1.9292*
AL*AL -0.9065 1.1797 -0.76839
AL*ALH -0.23189 0.55749 -0.41596
AL*INS -0.39154 0.55555 -0.70478
AL*AS -0.41244 0.28738 -1.4352
ALH -0.2796 0.26475 -1.0561
ALH*ALH 0.04393 0.40927 0.10734
ALH*INS 0.12536 0.27369 0.45804
ALH*AS 0.21874 0.1322 1.6547*
INS 0.21103 0.3522 0.59918
INS*INS 0.22129 0.45478 0.48658
INS*AS 0.056961 0.17128 0.33257
AS -0.15737 0.14264 -1.1033
AS*AS 0.17401 0.10509 1.6558*
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
= 508.573
= 103
significantly differentfrom zero at the 0.1level **significantly differentfrom zero at the 0.05level *** significantly differentfrom zero at the0.001 level52
Table 16
CoefficientEstimates ofSmall Firms
STANDARD
PARAMETER ESTIMATE ERROR T-STATISTIC
CONST 8.9455 0.29047 30.797"*
4 0.99221 0.19896 4.987"*
Q *Q 0.015555 0.10065 0.15454
Q*PK -0.014164 0.024391 -0.58072
Q*PR 0.024206 0.036553 0.66221
Q*PF -0.003864 0.0053603 -0.72077
Q*PL -0.006178 0.023044 -0.26809
Q*AL -0.051157 0.10869 -0.47066
Q*ALH -0.002652 0.14465 -0.018336
Q*INS 0.012028 0.1411 0.085244
Q*AS -0.031084 0.10186 -0.30516
PK 0.36741 0.041994 8.7492***
PK*PK 0.043653 0.020971 2.0816"
PK*PR -0.000983 0.02942 -0.033425
PK*PF -0.009067 0.0065284 -1.3889
PK*PL -0.033603 0.02588 -1.2984
PK*AL 0.0087742 0.048183 0.1821
PK*ALH 0.042881 0.036265 1.1824
PK*INS 0.043722 0.044254 0.98797
PK*AS 0.032624 0.020114 1.6219
PR 0.1161 0.068133 1.7041
PR*PR -0.000873 0.062006 -0.014079
PR*PF 0.0021184 0.0075792 0.2795
PR*PL -0.000262 0.043269-0.0060558
PR*AL -0.060455 0.06443 -0.93831
PR*ALH 0.0043861 0.054402 0.080623
PR*INS -0.036813 0.056557 -0.65089
PR*AS 0.025565 0.038131 0.67044
PF 0.051158 0.01169 4 .376"53
Table 16 Continued
STANDARD
PARAMETER ESTIMATE ERROR T-STATISTIC
PF*PF 0.035512 0.0075591 4.6979
PF*PL -0.028563 0.0055289 -5.1661"*
PF*AL -0.026033 0.012683 -2.0525"
PF*ALH 0.021057 0.014185 1.4844
PF*INS -0.005693 0.012201 -0.46662
PF*AS 0.013006 0.0070862 1.8355*
PL 0.46533 0.055746 8.3474 **
PL*PL 0.062428 0.049849 1.2523
PL*AL 0.077714 0.055429 1.402
PL*ALH -0.068324 0.054541 -1.2527
PL*INS -0.001216 0.050312 -0.024162
PL*AS -0.071195 0.029389 -2.4225"
AL 0.14379 0.36509 0.39384
AL*AL 0.43114 0.29438 1.4646
AL*ALH 0.075735 0.21156 0.35799
AL*INS 0.50428 0.29279 1.7223*
AL*AS 0.065129 0.17007 0.38295
ALH -0.31352 0.36404 -0.86121
ALH*ALH 0.14214 0.25922 0.54832
ALH*INS 0.01932 0.29255 0.066042
ALH*AS 0.069799 0.13645 0.51155
INS 0.65356 0.36737 1.779*
INS*INS 0.50885 0.25733 1.9774
INS*AS 0.056307 0.13779 0.40865
AS -0.16814 0.16081 -1.0456
AS*AS 0.063094 0.087866 0.71807
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= 468.253
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 104
significantly differentfrom zero at the 0.1level **significantly differentfrom zero at the 0.05level *** significantly differentfrom zero at the0.001 level54
VI.CONCLUSIONS
Deregulation of motorcarrier industryappeared to be
successful in truckloadsector.However, the revenue
concentration in theless-than-truckload sector still
remains to be explained.Many economists haveestimated
cost functions for theLTL segment of industryand found
constant returns toscale.These findings indicatethat
there is no costadvantage by increasinglevel of outputs.
Some studies treat allof the common carriersof general
freight asone homogeneous group, andothers argue that
there are heterogeneoussegments in these carriers.
This study examinedthe possible differencesin general
freight by lookingat Instruction 27 and28A carriers
separately.Results support thehypothesis that twosamples
are significantly differentimplying that thereare
heterogeneous segments incarriers of generalfreight.The
carriers of thesetwo sectionsappear to be different in
many aspects.The sample means ofvariables show that
carriers in Instruction28A has longer lengthof haul,
larger average loadand shipment size,and smaller factor
share in labor.The coefficients ofcost function estimates
indicated no scaleeconomies of any kind.Grimm, Corsi, and
Jarrell (1989) regardthe firms of Instruction28A as
general freight TL carriersand those of Instruction27 as55
general freight LTL carriers27.This differentiation may
be reasonable consideringthe characteristics of the firms
in Instruction 28A.
In the more homogeneous set ofdata, it was found that
tonmile revealseven larger magnitude of concentration in
the industry.Thus, this study compared thepossible
differences in the large andsmall carriers defined by level
of output in order to help explainthe revenue and tonmile
concentration in the LTL industry.
The two size groupsappear to engage in different types
of operation.Larger carriers in diverse services,and
small in more specific serviceswhich consist of short-haul
and valuable commodities.Large carriers seem to havemore
intermediate-hauls to connectshort-haul and long-haul
traffic effectively.Concerning these characteristicsof
service, Daughety, Nelson,and Vigdor (1985) found that
carriers of short-haul andvaluable commodity face 2.5 to3
times higher averagecosts than those of long-hauland low-
value commodity.Another implication from thedifferent
service is that since primaryservice of short-haul is
speed, the operationmay not require facilities suchas
terminals.Then, the entry barriermay not be significant
in short-haul LTL market.On the other hand, long-haul
27Grimm, Corsi, Jarrell (1989)argue that since average cost of LTL operationsare much higher than that of TL
operations,the cost functionoftwo sections should be
estimated separately.56
service of large firmsrequires the substantial fixedcosts
for terminals and network.Subsequently, there may be
significant structuraldifferences in carriers ofsizes.
Furthermore, large firmsseem to have two kinds of
advantages.One is a marketing advantagethat besides
product itself, large firmscan provide additive service
such as "computer tie-ins."The other is advantage in
production.It is evident from thepresence of economies of
density that large firmsstill have potentialto decrease
cost by reducing emptyback-haul or increasing density.
Also, the large firmscan produce greater variety Mof
service qualities.Firms may provide expensivespeedy
delivery or cheap slowdelivery since a vastnetwork enables
large firms to provideboth interspatial andintertemporal
service in widerrange.In contrast, small firmsmay be
limited to provide quickservice and delivery.Accordingly,
large firms havean advantage in both marketingand variety
of products over smallfirms.Keeler (1989) calls this
advantage "economies ofintegration."
Although it is possiblethat small firmsare avoiding
direct competition againstlarge firms by specializingin
short-haul service for ratherspecific customers, the
transaction costs savedby sippers by choosinglarge firms
can not be ignored.Consumers can get what theywant from
28 Vousden(1990) argues thatmore variety yields higher utility toconsumers and that scope economiesencourage firms to produce more thanone variety of products.57
large carriers, and there is less needto contact smaller
carriers.If economies of integration playa dominant role
in operations and sales, small firmsmay continue losing
market share.
Also, an aggressive expansion by large carriersmay
result from scope economies.While constant returns to
scale are the overwhelming findingsamong studies, the
possibility of economies ofscope has not yet been fully
explored.Thus, whether or not the combination of short-
haul and long-haul service decreases operatingcosts is an
especially important issue for futureresearch.
In conclusion, the main implication of thisstudy is
that revenue and output concentrationmay continue as long
as economies of integration and of route densityare
present.Revenue concentration may lead toan oligopolistic
market structure in the LTL segment iflarge market shares
are obtained by only a few large carriers.However, unless
the large firms engage in collusiverate making, they will
not be able to exert monopolypower.Thus, antitrust policy
could be used to prevent monopolyinefficiencies.58
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